En el trabajo se expondrá la teoría de la oración predicativa simple en Aristóteles conforme a su tratado De Interpretatione. Se prestará especial atención a las tesis planteadas por el autor en dicha obra y que presentan algún conflicto con tesis planteadas por autores contemporáneos tales como Frege, Husserl, Heidegger, Tugendhat, Austin y Searle.

The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition” of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the propositional content of (...) judgments in composed judgments do present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”, which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very close to Aristotle’s doctrine. (shrink)

En este trabajo se expone la doctrina acerca del juicio predicativo en Husserl con especial referencia a las doctrinas de Frege y Aristóteles. Se pone de manifiesto la discrepancia entre Husserl y Frege en torno a la concepción del juicio como acto de 'síntesis' y 'separación'. Bajo este respecto, Husserl se aproxima expresamente a la concepción de Aristóteles. Aparte de lo anterior, se plantea el problema acerca de la supuesta prioridad del juicio sobre los actos no judicativos, como deseo, orden, (...) ruego, etc. En este sentido se analiza una tesis de Husserl que sobrepasa a la concepción de Aristóteles y que deja la cuestión abierta acerca de la estructura fundamental de la razón. (shrink)

El presente trabajo sigue la pista a la posible distinción entre una composición aprehensiva y una composición judicativa, que plantea el problema del lugar propio de la verdad y de la falsedad. A este respecto, luego de establecer la opinión de Aristóteles y algunos de sus comentaristas, se sigue con la Tomás de Aquino y los comentarios escolásticos, para, finalmente mostrar cómo el problema sigue presente al interior de la lógica contemporánea.

A partir del problema básico de la inducción, esto es, cómo a partir de observaciones particulares es posible obtener enunciados universales, se analiza la solución de Popper, la que es caracterizada, en un sentido amplio, de pragmática. En el presente trabajo, por tanto, se comenzará por exponer la propuesta pragmática de Popper, tratando de establecer, posteriormente, si su propuesta puede enmarcarse y bajo qué condiciones en lo que se entenderá por pargamatismo crítico, en la línea de Wittgenstein y otros autores (...) contemporáneos. (shrink)

La Consolación de la Filosofía es una obra maestra de la literatura filosófica, concebida por su autor estando encarcelado y exiliado a la espera del dictamen definitivo del juicio político en su contra, que lo condena a ser ejecutado. Consta de cinco libros. Está escrito alternadamente en verso y prosa. Se trata de un diálogo sostenido por Boecio con la dama Filosofía. En el verso de inicio, Boecio deprimido anímicamente narra su desgraciada suerte, que en otro tiempo fuera próspera y (...) feliz. El problema que en tales circunstancias agobia su corazón está claramente expresado en el verso quinto del libro primero, y será tematizado filosóficamente a lo largo de toda la obra. En dicho verso, dirigiéndose al Creador de cielo y tierra, le cuestiona que las cosas estén regidas por fijas leyes establecidas por su voluntad y que los hombres, en cambio, estén abandonados a la tornadiza suerte. ¿No sería más justo que también los actos humanos estuviesen sometidos al mismo orden? El problema de fondo vendría a ser la conciliación entre la libertad del hombre y la voluntad divina, sin caer en un fatalismo. (shrink)

Millán-Puelles' theory of freedom is radically separated from all other views that attribute an absolute character to human freedon. One of these theses is precisely that of Schelling, according to whom "the essence of the self is freedom".

El presente trabajo aborda el tema acerca del conocimiento divino de los actos libres del hombre. El problema se relaciona con el tratamiento de Aristóteles acerca de los enunciados sobre futuros contingentes. Si Dios conoce los actos futuros libres, etos es, antes de su realización, y los conoce con verdad determinada, deberían estar predeterminados, y en tal caso no podrían ser libres. Se da cuenta en especial el tratamiento del tema por parte de los autores ibéricos de los siglos inmediatamente (...) posteriores al Descubrimiento de América, esto es, Domingo Báñez, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suá-rez; a su vez se da cuenta de estos planteamientos en base al pensamiento del escotista chileno Alonso Briceño. This paper addresses the divine knowledge of man's free acts. The problem is related to Aristotle's approach to utterances about future contingencies. If God knows of free future acts, that is, befare their realization, and knows them with determined truth, these acts should be predetermined and, in that case, they could not be free. The approaches to this subject taken by Spanish authors from the period after the Discovery of America, such as Domingo Báñez, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suárez as well as the approach adopted by Chilean Scotist Alonso Briceño are especially discussed. (shrink)

This paper analyses two texts of Aquinas (Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3, and Expositio libri peryermeneias I, 3, 107 ss.) where the truth of practical intellect is defined in accordance with Aristotle's account in Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a27-31. The proposed interpretation tries to show that both texts are arguably not incompatible. A last important claim is that according to the definition of practical truth practical intellect is supposed to work as a mesure for reality.

Práce, která uvádí do živé problematiky vědecké estetiky, řeší v první části problémy a úkoly estetiky, obrací se k jejímu předmětu, ke krásnu a umění, obírá se významem signální teorie pro estetiku, poměrem člověka k obrazu astavbě i pokrokem v hudbě a umění vůbec. Do druhé části jsou zařazeny vybrané kapitoly jednak z dějin řecké, jednak z české estetiky.

In diesem Band werden Beiträge gesammelt, die sich nicht nur auf rein formal logische Aspekte, sondern auch auf Probleme beziehen, die mit der Erkenntnistheorie, der Naturphilosophie und der Dialektik in Verbindung stehen. Iván de los Ríos Gutiérrez stellt die Aristotelische Kontingenzlehre dar. Miguel García-Valdecasas erörtert die wissenschaftstheoretischen Fundamente der Aristotelischen Nous-Lehre. Joseph Li Vecchi entwickelt ein formales Modell für Inferenzen, die auf der Grundlage von analogischen Verhältnissen basieren. Niels Öffenberger charakterisiert die abgeleiteten Wahrheitswerte, die sich durch die Dichotomie der schlichten (...) Wahrheit und der schlichten Falschheit ergeben. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe und María Cerezo verteidigen durch eine Interpretation der Struktur der Assertion die Gültigkeit des Bivalenz prinzips im Rahmen der Aristotelischen Wahrheitstheorie. Gabriela Rossi präsentiert eine systematische Darstellung der Rolle der lysis als Instrument der Aristotelischen Dialektik. Mirko Skarica untersucht die zeitgenössische Rezeption der Aristotelischen Auffassung des einfachen prädikativen Satzes bei Vertretern sowohl der analytischen als auch der phänomenologischen Tradition. Alejandro G. Vigo charakterisiert das Aristotelische Modell der Kausalerklärung in der Naturphilosophie in Verbindung mit dem Begriff eines sog. Hintergrundsholismus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery ed. by Kevin WhiteIván JaksicKevin White, editor. Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 326. Cloth, $59.95.The quincentennial of what has been termed the “encounter” between Europeans and Indians in the New World in the late fifteenth century furnished the occasion for much denunciation of the evils inflicted by greedy (...) intruders on the indigenous population and their environment. Many a conference was convened to reflect on such [End Page 463] events from the perspective of what appeared to be a consensus on the ultimately negative effects of European discovery, conquest, and colonization. In this context, it is quite remarkable that a conference on Hispanic philosophy in the age of discovery should have been convened to examine the philosophical figures and treatises of the era. As it turns out, this volume represents probably one of the most enduring outcomes of the myriad activities of 1992. This is a volume that ranges widely into the philosophical world of the period, brings to light the richness and significance of philosophers and their work, and provides a coherent and consistently well-researched set of essays.The volume consists of fifteen essays divided into five parts. Part I consists of one essay by Jorge J. E. Gracia which offers a wide panorama of Hispanic philosophy from 1500 to 1650, as well as a lucid interpretation of the historical reasons why Hispanic philosophy seems to have reached a dead end in the context of modern European philosophy, and suffered the neglect of intervening centuries. Part II consists of one essay by Mauricio Beuchot on discussions concerning the conquest of Mexico; two essays by John Doyle and Marcelo Sánchez-Sorondo on the work of Francisco de Vitoria; and two essays on the celebrated dispute between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas in 1550–51, the first by Eduardo Andújar and the second by Rafael Alvira and Alfredo Cruz. Part III includes essays by William Wallace on Domingo de Soto and Galileo’s science; Juan Antonio Widow on the economic thought of the Spanish Scholastics; Jean de Groot on the mysticism of Teresa de Avila; Yves Floucat on St. John of the Cross, and Mirko Skarica on the problem of future contingents. Part IV includes three essays by Norman Wells, Stephen Menn, and Carlos G. Noreña on the works of Francisco Suárez, probably the best-known Spanish thinker of the period. The volume closes with Part V, which has a long essay by John Deely on John Poinsot’s doctrine of signs.A volume of this scope and nature is bound to contain some overlap and repetition, as is the case with the pieces concerning the Las Casas-Sepúlveda debate. And yet these essays read well because the authors seriously undermine the conventional treatment of Sepúlveda as the hawkish defender of Indian slavery, and place him in the context of a larger Renaissance view of non-European peoples. Las Casas, in the view of the authors, had a great deal more in common with his opponent than the historiography has thus far suggested. In other sections of the volume, the variety of approaches and subjects on the part of the contributors challenges the reader to constantly shift grounds. Part III, for instance, takes us from the disquisitions on the velocity of falling bodies to the moral aspects of economic thought, and to the meaning of mystical theology. Fortunately, the competence of the researchers makes all individual pieces worthwhile even if this particular reviewer would have been somewhat more stringent with the space allotted to make a point.Contributors to this book leave no doubt as to the importance of their subjects, and yet they resist the temptation of exaggerating the extent of the influence of many of the Spanish authors on other European thinkers. Indeed, the essay by Norman Wells shows that while one must consider the linkages between Suárez and Descartes, there is [End Page 464] no reason to believe that the latter made Suárez’s position on the moderni... (shrink)

Innovation is necessary to deal with challenges that climate change brings for agriculture, such as droughts, floods, pests and pathogens that enter new climatic regions, and challenges relating to the labour force. There is a dominant narrative that science and technology are the locus of innovation, and that the solutions developed can change systems. Indeed, history shows how the Green Revolution started a massive change in practices worldwide and gave science and technology the main role. Innovation, however, also happens outside (...) universities or industry research. Particularly in agriculture, it happens in the field through farmers’ experimentation. This opens up the idea of who is an innovator, and it is crucial to tackling climate challenges to agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of curiosity as a virtue of innovators. Instead of looking at systems of innovation, or at innovations themselves, we add to the growing scholarship on virtues of innovators. Among those virtues, curiosity is prominent. We argue that different contexts require different forms of the innovator virtues, and we conceptually investigate how such virtues ought to be cultivated in order to contribute to solving 21st century challenges for agriculture. (shrink)

What do we know about Hegel? What do we know about Marx? What do we know about democracy and totalitarianism? Communism and psychoanalysis? What do we know that isn't a platitude that we've heard a thousand times - or a self-satisfied certainty? Through his brilliant reading of Hegel, Slavoj Zizek - one of the most provocative and widely-read thinkers of our time - upends our traditional understanding, dynamites every cliché and undermines every conviction in order to clear the ground for (...) new ways of answering these questions. When Lacan described Hegel as the ‘most sublime hysteric’, he was referring to the way that the hysteric asks questions because he experiences his own desire as if it were the Other's desire. In the dialectical process, the question asked of the Other is resolved through a reflexive turn in which the question begins to function as its own answer. We had made Hegel into the theorist of abstraction and reaction, but by reading Hegel with Lacan, Zizek unveils a Hegel of the concrete and of revolution - his own, and the one to come. This early and dazzlingly original work by Zizek offers a unique insight into the ideas which have since become hallmarks of his mature thought. It will be of great interest to anyone interested in critical theory, philosophy and contemporary social thought. (shrink)

This study re-examined the impact of personal and organizational values congruency on positive work outcomes and investigated the extent to which this relationship is affected by demographic variables. Data collection paralleled an earlier study (Posner and Schmidt, Journal of Business Ethics 12,1993, 341) and validated those findings, lending additional credibility to the continuing importance of this phenomenon. Both personal values congruence and organizational values clarity were significantly related to commitment, satisfaction, motivation, anxiety, work stress, and ethics using a cross-sectional sample (...) of 711 managen from across the United States. Gender, educational level, and functional area did not impact these relationships, although years of experience (expressed by age, managerial experience, and hierarchical level) did make a difference. (shrink)

Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions of non-literal, (...) non-descriptive symbols. (shrink)

Large‐scale patterns of correlated growth in development are partially driven by competition for metabolic and informational resources. It is argued that competition between organs for limited resources is an important mesoscale morphogenetic mechanism that produces fitness‐enhancing correlated growth. At the genetic level, the growth of individual characters appears independent, or “modular,” because patterns of expression and transcription are often highly localized, mutations have trait‐specific effects, and gene complexes can be co‐opted as a unit to produce novel traits. However, body parts (...) are known to interact over the course of ontogeny, and these reciprocal exchanges can be an important determinant of developmental outcomes. Genetic mechanisms underlie cell and tissue behaviors that allow organs to communicate with one another, but they also create evolutionarily adaptive competitive dynamics that are driven by physiological and biophysical processes. Advances in the understanding of competitive and closely related coordinative interactions across scales will complement existing research programs that emphasize the role of cellular mechanisms in morphogenesis. Study of the large‐scale order produced by competitive dynamics promises to facilitate advances in basic evolutionary and developmental biology, as well as applied research in fields such as bioengineering and regenerative medicine that aim to regulate patterning outcomes. (shrink)

Here we develop a view of language as a form of material engagement, one that foregrounds its embodied and ecological character. Achieving such a view, however, requires disabusing ourselves of certain received and deeply entrenched notions. We present a thought experiment meant to illuminate the materiality of language, as a technological activity on par with the construction and manipulation of artifacts. We explore its implications, justifying the comparison with actual languages while emphasizing revealing differences. Ultimately, we hope to expose the (...) embodied and enactive nature of language, offering a view of language as continuous with our engagement with the environment, as opposed to a picture of language as an essentially symbolic system or code. (shrink)

While much discussion in bioethics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of medicine concerns the proper handling and uses of value considerations, there has been little discussion about how to identify or recognize values in medical/scientific discourse. This article presents a heuristic method for identifying values in such discourses. Values are defined as descriptions or conditions that guide human action and are praise- or blameworthy. Values manifest themselves in discourses in one or more of three dimensions: linguistic, causal, and descriptive; each (...) with distinctive “subtypes”. By recognizing the various ways that values manifest in discourses, a “values scholar” can ask relevant questions of the discourse and thereby come to recognize potential evaluative meanings in the discourse. Numerous examples are provided from the author's own research program. Strengths, limitations, and paths to developing the model are briefly discussed. (shrink)

"Williams on Truthfulness" is a review of Bernard Williams's Truth and Truthfulness. It argues that Williams explicates truthfulness as a thick concept that depends on but diverges from a mere propensity to utter truths. Besides conveying an understanding of the complex virtue of truthfulness, it thus shows why thick concepts are not simply descriptive concepts overlaid with expressive glosses.

In many-valued logics with the unit interval as the set of truth values, from the standard negation and the product (or, more generally, from any strict Frank t-norm) all measurable logical functions can be derived, provided that also operations with countable arity are allowed. The question remained open whether there are other t-norms with this property or whether all strict t-norms possess this property. We give a full solution to this problem (in the case of strict t-norms), together with convenient (...) sufficient conditions. We list several families of strict t-norms having this property and provide also counterexamples (the Hamacher product is one of them). Finally, we discuss the consequences of these results for the characterization of tribes based on strict t-norms. (shrink)

In the most rigorous articulation of his philosophical system to date, Slavoj Žižek provides nothing short of a new definition of dialectical materialism. In forging this new materialism, Žižek critiques and challenges not only the work of Alain Badiou, Robert Brandom, Joan Copjec, Quentin Meillassoux, and Julia Kristeva (to name but a few), but everything from popular science and quantum mechanics to sexual difference and analytic philosophy. Alongside striking images of the Möbius strip, the cross-cap, and the Klein bottle, Žižek (...) brings alive the Hegelian triad of being-essence-notion. Radical new readings of Hegel, and Kant, sit side by side with characteristically lively commentaries on film, politics, and culture. Here is Žižek at his interrogative best. (shrink)

This study uses the American Association of University Women 1993 survey on sexual harassment in America's schools, a national sample of high school students, to examine gender differences in the behavioral, emotional, and educational consequences of sexual harassment. Previous research indicates that a high percentage of both boys and girls experience sexual harassment and that the negative consequences are greater for girls. The authors use a feminist theoretical framework to show that girls' and boys' qualitatively different experiences account for part (...) of this gender gap. Girls are far more likely to perceive harassment as harmful than boys and to experience a far greater frequency and severity of harassment. This article documents that girls are more likely to be targets of physical sexual harassment than boys and that physical harassment rather than derogatory or verbal and/or visual forms of harassment exacerbate the gender gap in educational outcomes. (shrink)

A recent literature review of commentaries and ‘state of the art’ articles from researchers in psychiatric genetics (PMG) offers a consensus about progress in the science of genetics, disappointments in the discovery of new and effective treatments, and a general optimism about the future of the field. I argue that optimism for the field of psychiatric molecular genetics (PMG) is overwrought, and consider progress in the field in reference to a sample estimate of US National Institute of Mental Health funding (...) for this paradigm for the years 2008 and 2009. I conclude that the amounts of financial investment in PMG is questionable from an ethical perspective, given other research and clinical needs in the USA. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.4 (2004) 357-359 [Access article in PDF] A Madness for the Philosophy of Psychiatry John Z. Sadler His enthusiasm brimming over with the rich set of ideas and problems he has discovered, Louis Charland's essay on identity, ethics, and the Internet should be grist for the philosophy of psychiatry mill for years. Indeed, a brief commentary cannot answer the many questions raised by his paper. (...) In response, I would like to focus on two general issues for this essay. Labels, Diagnoses, Reference, Experiences Many psychiatrists will take issue with Charland's use of the term label in reference to mental disorder concepts in this paper. I did not, but his relatively uncritical use of the labels and labeling terms in his essay prompts me to unpack some concepts that lurk behind the many other conceptual issues raised here. Psychiatric "labels" and "labeling" have a derogatory sense for many psychiatrists, because they are associated with a virulent antipsychiatry temperament dating back to the 1960s, at least in the United States (Sadler 2003). For many clinicians (as well as others) labeling implies that there is nothing more to psychiatric diagnosis and "mental illness" than the names given to various sorts of human diversity. This sort of psychiatric nominalism, the viewpoint goes, serves to pigeonhole people for the purposes, primarily, of political control or power. Charland's own viewpoint is more subtle than this, illustrated by his discussion of Hacking's "looping effects" and the related idea that social factors are influential in the manifestations, even causation, of mental disorders, but are not exhaustive in explaining mental disorders. However, because the whole matter of social construction of clinical phenomena is at the heart of Charland's discussion, further consideration of this metaphysical territory is warranted.The notion of a mental disorder concept as "label" betrays little about what, substantively, mental disorders are. A label on a can of peas tells us little, ultimately, about the nature of the contents; indeed, it is only a clue. When we shift labeling from a can of peas to a person—a self—then such a shallow clue to the "contents" of a person is an offensive simplification of a person's identity and selfhood. Hence the railing against psychiatric labeling in the 1960s through today.The general goals for psychiatric diagnosis and classification in systems like DSM-IV is are multiple, but at minimum, such denotations of clinical conditions are intended to advance the generation of knowledge about the conditions as well as provide a "shorthand" for clinicians in communicating about and understanding patients' conditions. How successful these diagnostic classification systems are for these and other purposes is a discussion for another time, but the [End Page 357] point here is that some sort of method of characterizing people's distresses is a precondition for understanding and explaining such distresses. The scientific processes of validation of psychiatric categories, at core, are to ensure that, as Gorenstein notes (1992), our clinical concepts are not empty, self-fulfilling prophecies, but rather refer to other, hopefully predictable, features of the patient's distress. Such validation of clinical "constructs" is the basis for developing and testing specific treatments, as well as understanding more richly and deeply the clinical phenomenon. To have a label, then, under this view, is to have an empty nominalization, which is offensive and scientifically vapid. To have a diagnostic construct—a disorder—is to have a concept which empirically refers to, as Paul Meehl put it, a "nomological network" of predictable, lawlike, implications (Sadler 2004a).However, as Charland, Hacking, and others have noted, the reflexivity of the human self and our ultimately crude ways of characterizing selves leads to a serious problem, even for the most rigorously validated psychological categories. That problem is the changeability of the self, the capacity of people to remake themselves according to their own ideas along with the sociocultural ether of ideas that surrounds us all. This means that our understanding of mental disorders, both as aggregates of features, and well as individual patients over time, are "moving targets," the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 295 [Access article in PDF] Agency, Narrative, and Self:A Philosophical Case Conference John Z. Sadler and K. W. M. Fulford This issue of PPP features our second "philosophical case conference," which addresses three important and interrelated concepts in the philosophy of psychiatry. Our first philosophical case conference (Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Volume 5, Number 2, 1998) featured detailed case material concerning the manifold (...) issues involved in psychiatric euthanasia. For this issue, guest edited by J. Melvin Woody, the rich cases supplied by Lloyd Wells provide the foundation for a discussion of narrative accounts of the self and what it means to be an agent.Philosophical case conferences are an occasional feature of PPP, and develop topics to satisfy one or more criteria: to provide discussions that are important to clinical practice or research, to embed current or perennial philosophical debates in the nitty gritty of clinical practice and personal experience, and/or to provide a clinical testing ground for new conceptual developments relevant to the philosophy of psychiatry.The format for this issue involves four feature articles, the first by Wells, presenting detailed case material of several patients, followed by discussions (by Kennett & Matthews, Phillips, and Woody) inspired by, or addressing explicitly, the philosophical questions implied in such cases. Following these four feature articles, a panel of commentators (Glas, Hardcastle, Radden, Thornton, Weiner, Woodbridge) respond to the four feature articles as they wish, providing the variations on the agency, narrative, and self themes. We think you will find this issue of PPP to be a fine example of what the philosophy of psychiatry can do, and we give our abundant thanks to Mel Woody for putting this issue together.... (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda el problema de la infancia dentro de la filosofía mo- derna y contemporánea, así como la relación conceptual que ésta tiene con la literatura, en especial, con lo que se analiza como novela infantil y novela familiar. Con apoyo de algunas ideas de Deleuze y Guattari, así como de Schérer y Hocquenghem, a la par de fragmentos de novelas, se busca establecer una crítica a las nociones de ontología y libertad establecidas en torno a la infancia (...) por la modernidad. Esta crítica permitirá comprender la infancia y su posible emancipación como alternativa plástica para crear nuevas subjetividades o experiencias políticas dentro del mundo. (shrink)

The contributions of leading Kantian and Kierkegaardian scholars to this collection break down to the simplistic contrast in which Kant is seen as the advocate of a rational moral theology and Kierkegaard as the advocate of an irrationalist faith. This collection is an ideal text for discussion of central issues.

Typescripts, essays, and an authoritative edition of Knowing and the known, Dewey's collaborative work with Arthur F. Bentley. In an illuminating Introduction T. Z. Lavine defines the collaboration's three goals-the construction of a new language for behavioral inquiry, a critique of formal logicians, in defense of Dewey's Logic, and a critique of logical positivism. In Dewey's words: Largely due to Bentley, I've finally got the nerve inside of me to do what I should have done years ago. What is it (...) to be a linguistic sign or name? and Values, valuations, and social facts, ' both written in 1945, are published here for the first time. (shrink)